Marsh v. Alabama/Opinion of the Court

Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company-town it would have been clear that appellant's conviction must be reversed. Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, and others which have followed that case, ^[1] neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will. We have also held that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets can not be justified on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to them. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869. And we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could not without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of literature. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146, 147, 63 S.Ct. 862, 865, 87 L.Ed. 1313. From these decisions it is clear that had the people of Chickasaw owned all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners together could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to pass an ordinance completely barring the distribution of religious literature. Our question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the town? For it is the state's contention that the mere fact that all the property interests in the town are held by a single company is enough to give that company power, enforceable by a state statute, to abridge these freedoms.

We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relationship between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a 'business block' in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business block. Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340, 24 L.Ed. 224. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. As we have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town. The 'business block' serves as the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. ^[5] These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen. ^[6]

When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. ^[7] As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free government by free men' and we must in all cases 'weigh the circumstances and appraise * * * the reasons * * * in support of the regulation of (those) rights.' Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand. The case is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Notes[edit]

^1  Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; dissent of Chief Justice Stone in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1240, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 141 A.L.R. 514, adopted as the opinion of the Court, 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890, 87 L.Ed. 1290; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667, 87 L.Ed. 873; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938, 152 A.L.R. 317.

^2  We do not question the State court's determination of the issue of 'dedication.' That determination means that the corporation could if it so desired, entirely close the sidewalk and the town to the public and is decisive of all questions of state law which depend on the owner's being estopped to reclaim possession of, and the public's holding the title to, or having received an irrevocable easement in, the premises. City of Demopolis v. Webb, 87 Ala. 659, 6 So. 408; Hamilton v. Town of Warrior, 215 Ala. 670, 112 So. 136; Town of Leeds v. Sharp, 218 Ala. 403, 405, 118 So. 572; Forney v. Calhoun County, 84 Ala. 215, 4 So. 153; Cloverdale Homes v. Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712. The 'dedication' of a road to the public may also be decisive of whether, under Alabama law, obstructing the road constitutes a crime, Beverly v. State, 28 Ala.App. 451, 185 So. 768, and whether certain action on or near the road amounts to a tort. Thrasher v. Burr, 202 Ala. 307, 80 So. 372. But determination of the issue of 'dedication' does not decide the question under the Federal Constitution here involved.

^3  Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 291 U.S. 227, 54 S.Ct. 427, 78 L.Ed. 767; American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 307 U.S. 486, 59 S.Ct. 948, 83 L.Ed. 1414; Mills et al. v. St. Clair County et al., 8 How. 569, 581, 12 L.Ed. 1201; Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, 824, 825, 826, 58 L.Ed. 1330; Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 198, 41 L.Ed. 560; Norfolk & S. Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264, 32 S.Ct. 828, 56 L.Ed. 1082; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 26 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed. 192, and cases cited on pages 293-295 of 199 U.S., on pages 94, 95 of 26 S.Ct.

^4  And certainly the corporation can no more deprive people of freedom of press and religion than it can discriminate against commerce. In his dissenting opinion in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1240, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 141 A.L.R. 514, which later was adopted as the opinion of the Court, 319 U.S. 103, 104, 63 S.Ct. 890, 87 L.Ed. 1290, Mr. Chief Justice Stone made the following pertinent statement: 'Freedom of press and religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least be entitled to the same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that the more general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce. Whatever doub § may be entertained as to this Court's function to relieve, unaided by Congressional legislation, from burdensome taxation under the commerce clause, see Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441, 446-455, 59 S.Ct. 325, 328, 331-335, 83 L.Ed. 272; McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 184, 185, 60 S.Ct. 504, 508 (509), 84 L.Ed. 683, it cannot be thought that that function is wanting under the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech, press and religion.' 316 U.S. at pages 610, 611, 62 S.Ct. at page 1245, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 141 A.L.R. 514.

^5  In the bituminous coal industry alone, approximately one-half of the miners in the United States lived in company-owned houses in the period from 1922-23. The percentage varied from 9 per cent in Illinois and Indiana and 64 per cent in Kentucky, to almost 80 per cent in West Virginia. U.S.C.oal Commission, Report, 1925, Part III, pp. 1467, 1469 summarized in Morris, The Plight of the Coal Miner, Philadelphia, 1934, Ch. VI, p. 86. The most recent statistics we found available are in Magnusson, Housing by Employers in the United States, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 263 (Misc. Ser.) p. 11. See also United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Data on Pay Roll Deductions, Union Manufacturing Company, Union Point, Georgia, June 1941; Rhyne, Some Southern Cotton Mill Workers and Their Villages, Chapel Hill, 1930 (Study completed under the direction of the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina); Comment, Urban Redevelopment, 54 Yale L.J. 116.

^6  As to the suppression of civil liberties in company-towns and the need of those who live there for Constitutional protection, see the summary of facts aired before the Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Hearings pursuant to S.Rec. 266, summarized in Bowden, Freedom for Wage Earners, Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov. 1938, p. 185; Z. Chafee, The Inquiring Mind (New York, 1928), pp. 173-74; Pamphlet published in 1923 by the Bituminous Operators' Special Commi tee under the title The Company Town; U.S.C.oal Commission, Report, supra, Part III, p. 1331.

^7  Jones v. Opelika, supra, 316 U.S. at page 608, 62 S.Ct. at page 1244, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 141 A.L.R. 514; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra, 319 U.S. at page 115, 63 S.Ct. at page 876, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81; Follett v. McCormick, supra, 321 U.S. at page 577, 64 S.Ct. at page 719, 88 L.Ed. 938, 152 A.L.R. 317